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GORnON A GRAY, 
Appellant, 
vs 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
Case No. 19005 
BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF UTAH, DEPARTMENT OF 
EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action before the Supreme Court of the State of Utah pur-
suant to Section 35-4-lO(i ), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended, seeking 
Judicial review of a decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial Com-
mission of Utah, which denied unemployment benefits to the Appellant, Gordon 
A. Gray, pursuant to Section 35-4-4(c), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended 
(Pocket Supplement, 1981), on the grounds that during certain weeks for 
which he claimed benefits he failed to demonstrate a "good faith" active 
effort to seek employment as required for eligibility. This disqualifica-
tion established an overpayment liability in the amount of $498, pursuant 
r" SPction 35-4-6(d), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended (Pocket Supple-
'11c11t, l 981). 
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DISPOSITION BELOW 
Appellant was denied unemployment benefits by a Department 
tive pursuant to Section 35-4-4(c), Utah Code Annotated 1953, as arnrn, 
(Pocket Supplement, 1981), effective August 29, 1982 and continuing, on,,, 
grounds he did not make an active search for work as required for el igibi 
ity. This decision established an overpayment liability in the amount 
$498. Plaintiff appealed to an Appeal Referee who modified the decision a· 
the Department Representative to deny benefits from August 29, 1982 throug'' 
October 30, 1982, with the exception of the weeks ended October 9 and 16, 
1982, which were allowed, and affirmed the overpayment liability in tr· 
amount of $498, by decision dated November 9, 1982, Case No. 82-A-4423. :, 
an Amended Decision dated November 17, 1982, the Appeal Referee affirmec 
her prior decision dated November 9, 1982, with the exception of the termin· 
ation date of the denial which was amended to end October 23, 1982, witr 
benefits allowed effective October 24, 1982 and a modification of the oHr 
payment from $498 to $664. The Appellant appealed to the Board of Reviewo' 
the Industrial Commission of Utah, which by decision, issued January 21, 
1983, in Case No. 82-A-4423, 82-BR-534, affirmed the decision of the Appea: 
Referee with respect to the denial of benefits for the period August 
1982 through October 23, 1982, with the exception of the calendar week endec 
September 25, 1982 which was allowed by the Board of Review. The Board o' 
Review modified the decision of the Appeal Referee to deny benefits to th. 
claimant for the calendar week ended October 9, l 982. The ove rpayme' 
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, "'<I hy the Appeal Referee in the amount of $664 was reduced by the 
,, ·' Ill Review to $498 for the calendar weeks ended September 4, Septem-
'"' 11 and September 18, 1982, which overpayment has been offset by subse-
val id claims filed by the claimant. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Appellant seeks a finding of the Court that the Appellant did in fact 
make a diligent job search effort that demonstrated his continuing attach-
ment to the labor market and such actions fully complied with requirements 
of Utah law; that the Appellant be reimbursed of all benefits denied him; 
and that the Department be enjoined from terminating his claim again for 
any reason other than exhaustion of benefits without first providing Appel-
lant with the due process of law. 
decision of the Board of Review. 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent substantially agrees with preliminary statement and state-
ment of facts set forth in Appellant's Brief, except in the following parti-
culars, to wit: 
In his preliminary statement at Page 4 of his Brief, Appellant states 
tl1e Appeal Referee "required that the overpayment of $498.00 be offset by 
withholding 50% of Appellant's weekly benefit amount." However, the Appeal 
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Referee only recommended "that the Department consider exerc1s1ny r1 11 rr 1 , 
and permit offset of not more than 50% of thP claimant's wPekly 1,, 
amount." (R.0047) 
Each unemployment insurance claimant is given an Unemployment ln<.ur,,, 
Claimant Guide (Referred to as the Handbook hereafter) {R.0167-0182) 
the time they apply for benefits. (R.0103) Although, at the time of h 
hearing with the Appeals Referee, Appellant didn't "recognize" the Handbo" 
(R.0092), he certified he had received one when he filed his initial clar 
for benefits on June 4, 1982. (R.0166) At the same time, the Appellant wo 
given a Form 601-D (R.0165) which he signed at the bottom, certifying he ha 
read it and understood that failure to comply with its provisions wou 
result in a denial of benefits. (R.0091) Further, the standard procedur. 
of the claims interviewer, who interviewed the Appellant when he filed hi 1 
claim, is to advise claimants to make two to three new in-person contact. 1 
each week and keep "record in the back of the Handbook. At the top of thr 
page in the back of the Handbook where claimants are to record their week'! 
job search efforts, the claims interviewer writes "two to three per week 
and then has the claimant circle the printed words "in person." {R.0106. 
0107) When Appellant first applied for unemployment benefits, he 
was instructed "to make 2 job contacts a week on the job search." (R.OOSJ 
and 0093) When he reopened his claim he was again instructed to keep h11 
contacts active. (R.0055) 
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In August, 1982, the Appellant attended a veterans workshop at the Job 
, 1 ''"'to receive instruction and assistance in regard to his search for 
,1 (R.Olll,0115,0118-0119) 
Mr. Samuel Smith, the Job Service Interviewer and Disabled Veterans 
Outreach Placement Specialist (R.0112) who conducts the veterans workshops 
(R.0114) testified that to find work a welder with the Appellant's experi-
ence needs to "knock on doors because the only people who are actually get-
ting jobs are in the right place at the right time." He further testified 
that making telephone contacts is not an effective way for someone like 
Appellant to find work because "the way the labor market is you call and 
they automatically are going to say no if they have a position open because 
they have 20 people knock on the doors." This advice was given at the 
Appellant's workshops. (R.0122) 
The Appellant received and read the claim cards, Form 603, (R.0183) as 
he filled them out. (R.0097) After Appellant had been disqualified he made 
up from memory the list of his job contacts found in the Record at R.0145-
0153 and marked as Exhibit 9. (R.0071) 
Although denied benefits for the six weeks in question, such a denial 
does not reduce the total amount of the Appellant's entitlement. It merely 
delays the receipt of the benefits to later weeks in which the claimant 
establishes his eligibility. (R.0010 and Addendum A) It should be noted 
that after the six week suspension of benefits, the claimant did receive, and 
hn, continued to receive unemployment benefits to the present time. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THAT IN REVIEWING DETERMINATIONS OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
UNDER THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT THE COURT WILL AFFIRM 
THE COMMISSION'S FINDINGS IF SUCH ARE SUSTAINED BY SUBSTANTIAL 
EVIDENCE. 
This Court has consistently held that where the findings of the Comm1s-
sion and the Board of Review are supported by evidence, they will not be dis-
turbed. Martinez v. Board of Review, 477 P. 2d 587 (Utah, 1970). In tnt 
case of Members of Iron Workers Union of Provo v. Industrial Commission, 139 
P. 2d 208, 211 (Utah, 1943), this Court held: 
If there is substantial competent evidence to sustain the 
findings and decision of the Industrial Commission, this 
court may not set aside the decision even though on a 
review of the record we might well have reached a differ-
ent result. 
With specific reference to the question of availability, this Court hos 
stated: 
It is our duty to examine the record and to affirm the 
decision unless we can say as a matter of law that the 
conclusion on the question of "available for work" was 
wrong because only the opposite conclusion could be 
drawn from the facts. Gocke v. Wiesley, 420 P. 2d 44,46 
(Utah, 1966); citing Salt Lake County v. Industrial Com-
mission, 120 P. 2d 321 (Utah, 1940). 
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POI NT I I 
Ill INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 35-4-4(c), U.C.A. 1953, UTILIZED 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION 
I IS CONSISTENT WITH THE LAW AND IS REASONABLE. 
The Appellant contends that the commission has applied in a rigid and 
inflexible manner the so-called 2-3 new in-person contact rule." That re-
quirement is, however, only an interpretive guideline that is considered 
viable in most occupations and areas, but is not applied rigidly or inflex-
iDly in all cases, nor has it been adopted as a formal general rule of adju-
di cation. 
Section 35-4-4{c) requires, by direct statutory language, that a claim-
ant for unemployment insurance make an active and good faith effort to secure 
employment each week that he files for benefits. The burden is upon the 
claimant to prove he has met the requirements and conditions for benefit 
payments, including of course the requirement that he has made the expected 
work search effort. Rule A71-07-2:1.b, General Rules of Adjudication, Mis-
cellaneous. Although the Utah Employment Security Act does not require that 
a claimant be engaged in a search for work for any given number of hours 
each day or week to prove he is engaged in an active good faith search, this 
Court has held that a claimant must be unequivocally exposed to the labor 
market and must show more than a passive willingness to gain employment. 
Qe_n_bt v. Board of Review, 567 P. 2d 626 (Utah, 1977); Gocke, supra. Thus, 
the question of whether or not a claimant has engaged in a good faith active 
'earch for work is a mixed question of law and fact. 
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With Utah unemployment compensation claims as high as 35,000 nur» 
particular week, and in recognition of the difficulty involved in the p1 ,w, 
adjudication and payment week by week of benefits, the Legislature gave, 
the Industrial Commission regulatory powers specifying that claims must 
filed in accordance with rules and regulations adopted by the Commission, 
Rule A71-07-2:2.c.(7), General Rules of Adjudication, supra, pro 
vi des: 
Inasmuch as each claimant is advised of his rights and 
responsibilities at the beginning of his claim series 
and since he certifies to eligibility requirements when 
continuing his claims, he should have sufficient knowl-
edge to put him on notice that certain subjects might be 
important factors relative to a claim for benefits. The 
claimant is then under obligation to make proper inquiry 
and failure to do so constitutes fault. 
When Appellant initially filed for benefits, he was given the Unemploy-
ment Insurance Claimant Guide and certified to the following statement on 
his initial claim form: 
understand that I must personally seek work and be able 
and available to accept full-time work. I have received 
the Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide explaining my 
rights and responsibilities. (R.0166) 
The Unemployment Insurance Guide provides: 
Make an active effort to look for work. An active effort 
means that you should contact several employers in eer-
son each week who would hire people in your occupational 
field. (R.0176, Emphasis added) 
"Several" obviously means more than one. 
Appellant also signed and received a copy of the "Responsibilities While 
Claiming Benefits" form which provides: 
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SPek work - I must make an active effort to look for 
tul l time work each week and will follow up on any job 
leads I am given by Job Service. An active effort, in 
part, means I will personally contact emrloyers who 
would hire people in my occupation. Fai ure to do so 
may be considered as evidence that I do not have a 
genuine desire to find immediate employment. (R.0165, 
Emphasis added) 
Mr. Samuel Smith, a Department Representative, with over seven years' 
experience as a Placement-Interviewer, who testified to his familiarity with 
the labor market for welders, and who has taught job search workshops for 
the Department, (R.0112-0114) testified to the need and reason for requiring 
in-person contacts as follows: 
Referee: think that calls for an evaluation of this 
particular claimant. Let's rephrase the ques-
tion and ask what should a welder do with 
Mr. Gray's experience be doing to try to find 
work? 
Smith: He would be considered a journeyman. The best 
thing he can do would be just knock on doors. 
Because the only people who are actually get-
ting jobs are in the right place at the right 
time. 
Referee: Is making telephone contacts a good way for 
someone like Mr. Gray to obtain employment? 
Smith: Presently, no. Because 90 percent, unless you 
have got a contact. But right now the way the 
labor market is you call and they automatically 
are going to say no if they have a position 
open because they have 20 people knock on the 
doors. 
Referee: Do you advise the people in your workshops, do 
you tell them this? 
Smith: Yes. 
Referee: Do you tell them what you just told me? 
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Smith: Yes. 
Referee: So you tell them to go out and knock on doors 
and to take their resume and to fill it out 
with the appplication and staple it on the 
front of the application? 
Smith: Right. (R.0122) 
This Court affirmed that the Department has the authority to make inter-
pretations of the Employment Security Act in areas of mixed questions of tau 
and law. In the case of Salt Lake City Corporation v. Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah and Marian Lynch, 657 P. 2d 1312, {Utah, 19811. 
this Court stated: 
In administrative law cases, our scope of review of an 
agency's decisions as to legal questions and questions 
of mixed law and fact is generally broader than our scope 
of review of questions of fact. On most questions of 
statutory construction, with some exceptions, our review 
is plenary with no deference accorded the administrative 
determination. That standard is particularly applicable 
with respect to constitutional law issues. However, 
where the language of a statute indicates a legislative 
intention to commit broad discretion to an agency to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the legislative scheme, we will 
not substitute our judgment for that of the agency as 
long as the commission's interpretation has "warrant in 
the record" and a "reasonable basis in the law." Unem-
ployment Com)ensation Commission v. Aragon, 329 U.s:-143, 
153-54 (1946 ; National labor Relations Board v. Hearst 
Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. lll, 131 (1944). Further-
more, where agency decisions deal with technical ques-
tions which call for the exercise of expertise, born 
either of a technical background and training or long 
experience in dealing with numerous, similar problems, 
we also accord deference to an agency interpretation 
because of the necessity to recognize discretion commen-
surate with the nature of the issue, as defined by the 
general purposes of the Act, although the latitude 
accorded may vary with the nature of the issue. SEC v. 
Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1946), provides an exam-
ple. The statutory language required that before the 
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Commission could give approval to a plan of reorganiza-
tion of a utility holding company, the Commission was 
required to determine among other things that the plan 
was "fair and equitable." 332 U.S. at 204. The stand-
ard of review under such legal criteria was based on 
deference to the "informed discretion" of the Commis-
sion and permitted reversal of the Commission's ruling 
only upon a plain abuse of its discretion. Id. at 208. 
[ 6 5 7 P • 2d , at l 31 6.] 
The minimal requirement placed upon claimants to contact 2-3 potential 
employers each week in person is reasonable and is supported by case law 
from other jurisdictions. For example, in Carr v. Administrator, Unemploy-
ment Compensation Act, 223 A. 2d 313 (Conn., 1966), the Commission was held 
to have acted reasonably in finding that the claimant had not made a reason-
able effort to look for work when he contacted only one or two places a week. 
See also Jones v. Administrator, Unemployment Compensation Act, 228 A. 2d 
807 (Conn., 1966); Redd v. Texas Employment Commission, 431 S.W. 2d 16 (Tx., 
1968). And in Steinberg v. Fusari, 364 F. Supp. 922 (Conn., 1973), cited on 
pages 22 and 24 of Appellant's Brief, the United Stated District Court for 
the District of Connecticut stated, contrary to the assertions of the Appel-
!ant, as follows: 
[l]f a stated number of employers must be visited, a 
claimant's acknowledgement that he had seen fewer than 
the required number would eliminate the factual con-
troversy and provide an adequate basis for denial of 
benefits. 
Considering the purpose of the work search requirement, the testimony of 
an experienced Department Placement Interviewer that most jobs are obtained 
by job seekers through personal contact, and the requirement of Denby v. _!.!!.:_ 
Justrial Commission, supra, that a claimant must be unequivically exposed to 
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the labor market, the requirement of 2-3 in-person contacts each WPP' 
reasonable and consistent with the generalized work-search requirPinrnl" 
tained in the Act. 
POINT I I I 
THE BOARD OF REVIEW OF THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION DID NOT ERR 
IN DETERMINING THAT PLAINTIFF FAILED TO MEET THE WORK SEARCH 
REQUIREMENTS FOR ELIGIBILITY AND THUS WAS NOT AVAILABLE FOR 
WORK, AND THIS DETERMINATION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVI-
DENCE. 
Appe 11 ant has misperceived the 2-3 new in-person contact requirement. 
Contrary to Appellant's assertion that the requirement is applied rigidly and 
inflexibly, it is utilized as a guideline by Department Representatives in 
determining eligibility. In the instant case the claimant was given written 
instructions, as set forth in Point II herein, concerning the requirement 
to make an active and good faith effort to find work by personally contact-
ing employers. 
Consistent with the written instructions given to the Appellant, the 
Appellant admitted that he was initially told by a Department Representative 
" ••• to make two job contacts a week on the job search." (R.0054) Com-
menting on the instructions given to claimants by the Department 
tive who handled the Appellant's claim, Roger Slagowski, the claimant's 
supervisor testified: 
Slagowski: She said "I advise the claimant to make 
two to three new in-person contacts each 
week and keep records in the back of the 
Claimant Handbook" and she said "at the 
top inside of the book of the Claimant 
Handbook, where it shows work-search record, 
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Referee: 
I write two to three per week" and down on 
the form it has the type of contacts 
she has them circled in-person. 
So she, in addition to what the Claimant 
Guide says, writes on that form "make 
two to three contacts a week" and circles 
in-person? 
Slagowski: That is correct. (R.0106) 
Aµpellant's Attorney stipulated to this testimony by Mr. Slagowski. (R.0104) 
When the claimant reopened his claim for benefits in August, he was 
again instructed to keep his contacts active. (R.0055) Finally, the claim-
ant attended a Job Search Work Shop in August, at which he was instructed to 
contact employers in person because telephoning was not productive. (R.0122) 
Despite the written instructions received by the claimant and, presumably, 
standard oral instructions by the claims interviewer (R.0106), and despite 
the instruction given at the workshop (R.0123), Appellant claimed he had 
not been instructed to make two to three new in-person contacts each week. 
(R.0163,0100,0086) 
It seems unlikely that the claims interviewer would have changed her 
standard instructions to claimants when interviewing the Appellant as he sug-
gests. (R.0086) Further, Appellant acknowledged that nothing prevented him 
from complying with the instruction to make in-person contacts. (R.0131) 
ThP claimant could read and write. (R.0097,0145-0152) He can't claim that 
he was hurried in the claim filing process or that he was not provided the 
opportunity to read and understand what he was filing as he was given the 
,,e,-essary papers on Friday and did not actually file his benefit claim until 
th" toll owi ng Monday. ( R. 0094) 
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Appellant's apparent failure to read the documents or to follow!' 
verbal instructions given to him does not excuse him from making the r·!''i'J' 
work search. It is because of this serious responsibility that claimants,, 
required to sign certifications that they have received and have been,, 
structed to read these documents. Claimants are also told there is the p01 _ 
sibility of a denial of benefits and penalties for failing to comply witn 
instructions from the Department. (R.0163,0165,0166,0176,0183) 
The record shows that the Appellant made only one new in-person con-
tact between August 29, 1982 and September 4, 1982 (R.0063), only one new 
in-person contact during the two weeks between September 5, 1982 and Septem-
ber 18, 1982, (R.0074) and no in-person contacts for the three weeks ir 
October for which he was denied benefits, (R.0144,0150,0151,0153) even 
though he signed a statement on September 27, 1982, which stated in part, 
"! now know I must make two to three new in-person contacts each week or 
benefits could be denied." (R.0163) This fact situation appears almost 
analogous to the situation in Marvin L. Hurd v. Board of Review, 638 P. 1d 
544 (Utah, 1981 ), wherein this Court held that a claimant, who had contacted 
only three businesses for the purpose of finding work during a 30 day period, 
was not entitled to unemployment compensation because his efforts showed 
only "a passive search for work" even though he alleged in his appeal to the 
Board of Review that he had made "numerous telephone cal ls pursuant to want 
ad listings." 638 P. 2d at 545. 
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,lust as the Appellant was instructed to make at least two in-person 
"•d'J with potential employers, Appellant was also instructed when he 
,,,,1 HI ly reopened his claim to keep an accurate record of his job contacts. 
11:.0lb2,0l65,0176) Pursuant to a letter from the Appeal Referee to Appel-
lant's Attorney, dated October 19, 1982 (R.0154), Appellant provided a 
list of all employers he had allegedly contacted after he reopened his claim 
for benefits on August 19, 1982. (R.0144-0153) However, this list which was 
admittedly begun after September 29, 1982 (R.0071) was made only to the best 
of Appellant's recollection (R.0071,0llO); conflicts with other papers he 
filed (R.0162); and conflicts with his own testimony. For example, Appellant 
lists that he filed applications with Ashby Metals, Mark Steel, and Allen 
Steel between September 4, 1982 and September 25, 1982. (R.0145-0146) The 
record shows, however, that app l i cat i ans with Ashby Metals and Mark Steel 
were submitted in June, 1982 (R.0060,0062) and the application with Allen 
"is about nine years old." (R.0065) Likewise, Appellant's list claims he 
made in-person contacts at eight businesses after reopening his claim. 
(R.0144) However, his testimony indicates that at least four of those bus-
inesses were only contacted by telephone. (R.0062,0065,0058) 
Such sporatic employer contacts, the failure to maintain an accurate 
rPcord, and particularly the failure to pursue in-person contacts after such 
explicit instructions, are inconsistent with an unequivocal exposure to the 
labor market and justify the denial of benefits in this case. 
Appellant relies on Gocke, supra as support for his contention that his 
search was adequate. See pages 15 and 16 of Appellant's Brief. However, 
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Gocke is distinguishable in that the claimant therein was not advisP<i ,,. 
the extent of work search she should be making. The claimant in G_ock_e tPI 
on the "Handbook for Claimants" which, when read literally, "doesn't 
any affirmative action by a claimant other than registration." •le. 
In the present case, however, there can be no doubt that Appellant was adVli 
ed as to the extent of work search he should be making and there can be nc 
doubt that he knew, or should have known, what constituted an active effw 
to secure employment. 
In applying the 2-3 new in-person contact requirement as a guideline 1n 
considering the claimant's eligibility for benefits, the Board of Review 
looked at the totality of the claimant's efforts to find work, as evidencea 
by the following statement from the decision of the Board of Review· 
In modifying the decision of the Appeal Referee to deny 
benefits for the calendar week ended October 9, 1982 and 
to allow benefits for the calendar week ended Septem-
ber 25, 1982, the Board of Review notes that for the cal-
ender week ended September 25, 1982 the claimant had made 
one in-person employer contact, supplemented by telephone 
contacts. However, during the calendar week ended Octo-
ber 9, 1982, all employer contacts were made by tele-
phone. As indicated in the Unemployment Insurance Claim-
ant Guide, telephone calls may be an effective way to 
develop leads to employes who have jobs in a claimant's 
occupational field. However, telephone calls alone are 
insufficient to demonstrate a "good faith" "active effort 
to secure employment." (R.0012-0013, Emphasis added) 
Thus, although the claimant made only one in-person contact for the wee< 
ended September 25, 1982, that contact was supplemented by telephone con· 
tacts. In contrast, the claimant's efforts to find work in prior weeks were 
limited to one in-person contact per week, or even less. Also in contrast. 
- l 6 -
1l1e ,1a1mant's employer contacts during the calendar week ended October 9, 
'!"/ were al I made by telephone. The Board of Review specifically held that 
', 1q1hune cal ls alone are insufficient to demonstrate a good faith active 
1ttort to secure employment. Again, the reason for this latter conclusion 
is the necessity of each claimant to be inequivocally exposed to the labor 
market. A claimant who does not have applications on file with those em-
ployers who are willing to accept applications, or who have not made personal 
contact with employers, is far less likely to be called for work by an em-
ployer who develops a job opening. 
In summary, the requirement of 2-3 in-person contacts is not an inflex-
ible rule, but rather, is a guideline for evaluating a claimant's work search 
efforts. The necessity for one who claims the benefits of the unemployment 
insurance program to expose himself to the labor market by a combination of 
in-person contacts and other work search efforts is obvious, and the Depart-
ment's requirements of such efforts and the maintenance of a record to evi-
dence such efforts are reasonable requirements consistent with the intent 
and purposes of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
POINT IV 
THE PROCEDURE BY WHICH THE COMMISSION TERMINATED UNEMPLOYMENT 
BENEFITS TO CLAIMANT GRAY DID NOT VIOLATE DUE PROCESS. 
Appellant contends in his Brief at Point IV that he was denied unem-
ployment benefits without prior notice and without opportunity for a Goldberg 
v. Ke_l_l_,r type of hearing before termination of benefits. In support of this 
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contention claimant cites the cases of v. _5.LJ_p_r_a, and(; 
fornia Department of Human Resources Development v. Java, 402 U.S. 121 (1% 
Appellant explains the Fusari case as holding that the "seated interv 1c, 
system did not provide sufficient procedural due process protect ions foe 
unemployment insurance claimants. A cursory review of the District Courr 
Opinion would lead one to that conclusion. The District Court held that 
the Connecticut procedures for determining unemployment insurance eligibilili 
violated due process as follows: 
.•• because (a) a property interest has been denied 
(b) at an inadequate hearing (c) that is not reviewable 
de novo until an unreasonable length of time. 364 F. 
Supp., at 937-938. 
The Connecticut legislature thereafter amended the review provisioITT 0 
its unemployment insurance law. The U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case 
to the District Court to determine whether the new provisions improved the 
time factor sufficiently to make the entire process legally sufficient, stat-
i ng: 
Prompt and adequate administrative review provides an 
opportunity for consideration and correction of errors 
made in initial eligibility determinations. 95 S.Ct., 
at 540. 
Thus a careful reading of the opinion of the Supreme Court in the 
case clearly shows that the Court was primarily concerned with the length of 
delay in obtaining proper review of a denial of benefits. This concern was 
subsequently specifically recognized by the Supreme Court in the case of 
Matthews v. Eldridge, 96 S.Ct. 893 (1976), citing Fusari at 906. 
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,11',dt,1lity insurance case, involved the precise issue to which Appellant 
111 Point IV of his Brief, that is, whether an individual claiming 
"""'rr11nent benefits under an entitlement program may be denied such bene-
t11, without a Goldberg v. hearing. 
In analyzing the issue presented, the Eldridge court set forth the 
factors to be considered in determining the amount of due process required 
in such cases, as follows: 
Accordingly, resolution of the issue whether the admin-
istrative procedures provided here are constitutionally 
sufficient requires analysis of the governmental and 
private interests that are affected. [Citations omitted] 
More precisely our prior decisions indicate that identi-
fication of the specific dictates of due process gener-
ally requires consideration of three distinct factors: 
First, the private interest that will be affected by the 
official actions; second, the risk of an erroneous depri-
vation of such interest through the procedures used, and 
the probable value, if any, of additional or a substitute 
procedural safeguard; and finally, the government's 
interests, including the function involved and the fiscal 
and administrative burdens that the additional or sub-
stitute procedural requirement would entail. [Citing 
Goldberg v. 
The Court then proceeded to analyze the individual interest involved 
in the Eldridge case, stating: 
Only in Goldberg has the court held that due process 
requires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary 
deprivation. It was emphasized there that welfare 
assistance is given to persons on the very margin of 
subsistence; "the crucial factor in this context -
a factor not present in the case of ..• virtually 
anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended -
is that termination of aid pending resolution of a 
controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible 
recipient of the very means by which to live while he 
waits. 397 U.S., at 264, 90 s.c. at 1018 (Emphasis 
in original)." Eligibility for disability benefits, 
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in contrast, is not based upon financial need. In-
deed, it is wholly unrelated to the worker's income or 
support from many other sources, such as earnings of 
other family members, workmen's compensation awards, 
court claims awards, savings, private insurance, public 
or private pensions, veterans' benefits, food stamps, 
public assistance, or the "many other important pro-
grams both public and private, which contain provisions 
for disability payments affecting a substantial portion 
of the work force. " [Footnotes and Citations 
omitted. 96 S.Ct., at 905] 
After considering the other two factors previously referred to, the 
court concluded that an evidentiary hearing is not required prior to the 
termination of disability benefits. 
The holding that pre-termination evidentiary hearings are not requirec 
was extended to unemployment insurance cases by Graves v. Meystrik, 425 F.1. 
40 (E.D. Mo.), affirmed 431 U.S. 910, 97 S.Ct. 2164, 53 L.Ed. 2d 220 (1977). 
See also Torres v. New York State Department of Labor, 333 F .s. 431 (S.D.N.Y., 
1971), affirmed 405 U.S. 949, 92 S.Ct. 1185, 31 L.Ed. 2d 228 (1972). 
Appellant's reliance on California Department of Human Resources Develop 
ment v. Java, supra, is likewise misplaced. The Java case involved a proce· 
dure whereby an employer could sit back and await an initial determination 
of a claimant's eligibility for unemployment benefits. If the determination 
found the claimant eligible, the employer could then appeal, thus causing the 
termination of the claimant's benefits pending the outcome of the employer's 
appeal. Such appeals took a median of seven to ten weeks to resolve. The 
U.S. Supreme Court held in Java that the suspension of unemployment benefits 
for such a lengthy period, after an initial determination of 
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1111,;ted due process. In the instant case the termination of Appellent's 
11•·l1ts was not initiated by an appeal of another party, but rather was 
1,ased on the claimant's own statements in an eligibility review. (R.0162-
11163). The eligibility review is an administrative device by which benefit 
claimants are periodically asked to prove their eligibility consistent with 
Rule A71-07-2:1.e.(l), General Rules of Adjudication, supra. Appellent was 
notified of the eligibility review and appeared as requested by the local 
office. (R.0161-0163) Thereafter Appellant received a notice of denial of 
benefits which he appealed in a timely manner to an Appeal Referee. (R.0160-
0157-0158) Appellant was given a notice of the appeal hearing setting forth 
the time, date, place and issues to be covered. (R.0155) As required by 
Section 35-4-10, U.C.A. 1953, Appellant was given a full evidentiary hearing 
and a decision was issued to him within six weeks from the date he was denied 
benefits (R.0148,0160) and only four weeks from the date of his appeal to the 
Referee. (R.0156) This procedure afforded Appellant the full due process 
of law required by Eldridge. 
POI NT V 
RECOVERING APPELLANT'S OVERPAYMENT BY DEDUCTING 100% OF APPEL-
LANT'S UNEMPLOYMENT BENEFIT CHECK WAS NOT EXCESSIVE AND IS EX-
PRESSLY REQUIRED BY THE UTAH EMPLOYMENT SECURITY ACT. 
Appellant claims the Department abused its discretion in ordering 100% 
of his weekly benefits withheld in order to recoup the overpayment. Plain-
tiff's Brief, Page 20. Plaintiff cites Section 70B-5-105, Utah Code Annotat-
'"1 19"3, for the proposition that "generally one's wages cannot be garnished 
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in exceeds of 25% of weekly disposable earnings or to an extent that 1 t "' 
drop the debtors wages below minimum wage." Plaintiff's Brief, Paye 
However, Section 708-5-105 is not applicable to recoupment of unemployme" 
benefits as it only applies to "rights arising from consumer credit salei, 
consumer lease, and consumer loans. Section 708-5-112, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953. 
The applicable statute in this instance is Section 35-4-6(d) of the Utar
1 
Employment Security Act which provides in pertinent part: 
If any person, by reason of his own fault, has received 
any sum as benefits under this act to which under a re-
determination or decision pursuant to this section, he 
has been found not entitled, he shall be liable to repay 
such sum, and or shall, in the discretion of the commis-
sion, be liable taliaVe such sum deducted from an future 
benefits paya e to mp asis added 
At first blush the above language from the code would appear to give 
the commission discretion as to whether or not to recoup an overpayment by 
deduction from future benefits and, therefore, to support Appellant's con-
tention that less than a 100% deduction would be permissable; however, it 
should be noted that there is no discretion as to whether the claimant 
repay the overpayment. The above Sect ion 35-4-6(d) of the Act goes on to 
say: 
In any case in which under this subsection a claimant 
is liable to repay to the commission any sum for the 
fund, such sum shall be collectible in the same manner 
as provided for contributions due under this act. 
Thus the commission's discretion appears to be limited to allowing the 
overpayment to be deducted from future benefits as opposed to requiring J 
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"l"\'111Pnt in cash. Having exercised that discretion, the Respondent has 
'""' 1<1Ned that it must recoup the overpayment from future benefits 
µdyable to the claimant." (Emphasis added) 
It should be noted in this regard that where a claimant has received 
benefits to which he was not entitled, a 100% recoupment leaves him in no 
worse a position than he would have been in had he not received the over-
payment in the first place. In fact, since no interest is added, the claim-
ant has had free use of money to which he was not entitled until it is in 
fact recouped. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent has established 2-3 new in-person employer contacts as 
a minimum interpretive guideline by which to consider whether a claimant has 
"acted in good faith in an active effort to security employment" as required 
by Section 35-4-4(c) of the Utah Employment Security Act. The work search 
of claimants who fail to meet the minimum guideline are closely scrutinized 
to determine whether under all the circumstances of the particular claimant 
it can be concluded he/she has "acted in good faith in an active effort to 
secure employment." This method of monitoring the work search efforts of 
claimants is both reasonable and consistent with the intent and purpose of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. 
Even though he was given an Unemployment Insurance Claimant Guide 
when he applied for benefits, which gives instructions in simple, layman's 
la11guage and has space wherein claimants are instructed to record their 
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contacts, this claimant made a written record of his contacts only aftei 
was initially denied benefits. Even though he was instructed that telepi 11 , 
ing was not an effective means of finding employment in his occupation,, 
persisted in using the telephone as his principle method of searching fr,, 
work. Therefore, the Appellant failed in meeting his burden of showing ac 
active, good faith effort to secure employment during the six weeks fer 
which he was denied benefits. 
Upon receiving Appellant's appeal from the termination of his benefits, 
based on information he gave at an eligibility review, the commission gavE 
the Appellant a timely, full evidentiary hearing, after notice, at which hE 
was represented by counsel. This procedure afforded Appellant the full due 
process of law. 
Rather than requiring the Appellant to repay his overpayment in cash, 
the Respondent all owed Appellant to repay his overpayment by deduction from 
future benefits as expressly provided in the Utah Employment Security Act. 
This method of recoupment left the Appellant in no worse position than he 
would have been had he not received the overpayment in the first place. 
Respondent submits that the decision of the Board of Review is sup· 
ported by substantial competent evidence; is consistent with the intent and 
purposes of the Utah Employment Security Act; and should, therefore, be 
affirmed by this Court. 
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llp<;pectful ly submitted this 3rd day of June, 1983. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General of Utah 
FLOYD G. ASTIN 
K. ALLAN ZABEL 
Special Assistant Attorney General 
Lorin R. Blauer 
Legal Counsel 
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